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Adjustment in an Open Economy with Two
Exchange-Rate Regimes
Sven W. Arndt1
Claremont McKenna College
Abstract. This paper examines adjustment in a model with three economies, two
exchange-rate regimes, and varying capital mobility. In the benchmark scenario,
the U.S. dollar fluctuates against the euro and the Chinese yuan, but capital
mobility is high in the former and low in the latter case. This generates offsetting
exchange-rate adjustments, which affect the efficacy of U.S. fiscal policy. In the
next two scenarios, the yuan is fixed against the dollar. Rate pegging by a large
country like China ―interferes‖ with U.S. macro adjustment and undermines U.S.
policy autonomy.
JEL Classification: F31, F32, F41
Keywords: Open economy macro, Exchange rate regimes, US-China payments
adjustment, Production networks
1. Introduction
In recent years, the United States has operated under a mixed exchange-rate
regime containing both fixed and floating elements. The country is officially
classified as a ―floater,‖ which accurately describes the nation‘s official policy. 2
However, it has been unable to prevent a large country – China – from pegging
its currency to the dollar.3 If China were a small country, this policy would have
no meaningful consequences for the United States. But China is not small and
hence its exchange-rate management does have implications for the U.S.
This paper explores the consequences of China‘s exchange-market
intervention for U.S. monetary and fiscal policy. It does so with an openeconomy model of a country which has a floating rate with one trading partner
and a fixed rate with a second trading partner. The two trading partners are the
European Monetary Union (EMU) or ―Euroland,‖ whose currency is the euro,
and the People‘s Republic of China, whose currency is the yuan or RMB. The
dollar floats freely against the euro, while its relationship to the yuan is managed
by the central bank of China. This gives the U.S. a de facto ―mixed‖ exchangerate regime.
Section 2 presents the model and works out a benchmark scenario in
which both exchange rates are fully flexible. In Section 3, China fixes its
currency to the dollar and recycles dollars accumulated in the process of
intervention by purchasing U.S. Treasury securities directly from the Federal
Reserve. This is the ―non-sterilization‖ scenario. In Section 4, intervention
dollars are recycled in the open market for U.S. Treasury securities. This is the
―sterilization‖ scenario. Section 5 concludes.
What distinguishes China from the many other countries that have pegged
their currencies to the U.S. dollar is that the People‘s Republic is large enough to
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affect macro adjustment in the American economy. Its exchange-rate
management has the capacity to interfere with the effectiveness of U.S. macro
stabilization policies and to compromise the flexibility of the dollar against other
currencies.
2. An Open Economy with Floating Rates
The basic frame of reference for the analysis that follows is the textbook model
of the open economy, modified to provide a three-country perspective.4
Specification of the U.S. monetary sector follows conventional lines:
H/P = L(y, i),

(1)

where L is the demand for real cash balances, y is real income and i is the
nominal interest rate. P is the price level, which is taken as given in the short run,
reflecting the well-known ―sticky-price‖ assumption of many macro models. In
the standard model, base money is specified as H = D + R, where D is domestic
credit and R represents foreign exchange reserves held by the domestic central
bank. In the case of China, however, it is the foreign central bank that holds
reserves of the U.S. currency. Hence, the relevant expression is H = D – RC +
TBC, where RC represents dollar accumulation by the Chinese central bank
through intervention in the foreign exchange market and TB C represents
purchases by the Chinese central bank of U.S. Treasury securities from the
public.
Equilibrium in the goods-producing sector is specified along standard lines,
except that the U.S. trade balance with each country appears separately in the
equation.
I(i) + T*(y*, y, E*) + T(yC, y, E) – S(y) = - G,

(2)

where investment, I, is a negative function of the rate of interest, where U.S.
trade with Europe, T*, and with China, T, is positively related to each country‘s
real GDP (y* and yC, respectively), negatively to U.S. real GDP (y) and
positively to the two nominal exchange rates (E* and E), expressed as the dollar
price of the respective foreign currencies. U.S. private real saving rises with real
GDP, and G represents the real government budget deficit.
There are, finally, two basic balance-of-payments equations:
T*(y*, y, E*) + K*(i, i*) = 0

(3)

T(yC, y, E) + K(i, iC) = 0,

(4)

And

where K* and K represent capital inflows into the U.S. from Europe and China,
respectively. Inasmuch as the current account is a flow variable, we count on
capital flows rather than the stock-adjustment components of the financial
account to provide ongoing funding for current account imbalances. Crosscountry interest differentials should cause agents to borrow where interest rates
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are low and to lend where they are high. We assume that such financial
intermediation between Euroland and the U.S. exhibits ―high capital mobility,‖
while financial flows between the U.S. and China are subject to low mobility, in
part because they are more vigorously controlled and regulated by the Chinese
authorities.
As written, equation (4) assumes that all capital flows between the U.S.
and China are autonomous. This assumption is appropriate when the yuan is
fully flexible, which is the scenario of this section. Subsequently, equation (4)
will be amended to accommodate the fixed-rate scenarios.
We begin by assuming that both exchange rates are fully flexible. This is
the regime that Washington policy makers have been working to achieve by
pressing China to allow the yuan‘s value to be determined by market forces. As
noted above, capital mobility is high with Europe and low with China.
2.1 Monetary Policy
A monetary expansion in the United States produces well-known results. The
expansion raises U.S. income and thereby causes both trade balances to
deteriorate. It lowers the rate of interest, bringing about capital outflows, which
impact negatively on U.S. financial accounts with both countries. As a result, the
dollar depreciates against both currencies. If we assume for the present that the
marginal import propensities in equations (3) and (4) are roughly similar, then
the current account deteriorations are roughly similar as well. 5 In view of
Europe‘s higher capital mobility, however, the decline in the U.S. interest rate
affects the financial account with that region more severely than that with China.
Hence, the dollar‘s depreciation against the euro is relatively larger. In the main,
however, this result is consistent with well-known findings that depreciation
enhances the effectiveness of monetary policy in achieving a reduction in the
U.S. output gap.
The essential features of the adjustment are depicted in Figure 1. Note that
the shift in goods-market equilibrium, represented by the ISXM curve, is the
result of changes in both exchange rates and that there are separate curves for
balance of payments equilibrium between the U.S. and its two trading partners.
The steeper curve (BP) reflects the assumption of low capital mobility vis-à-vis
China, while the flatter curve (BP*) accommodates the high degree of capital
mobility between the U.S. and Euroland. The monetary expansion shifts out the
LM curve, while the depreciation of the dollar against the two currencies shifts
the ISXM curve out and the two BP curves down. In the new equilibrium, U.S.
output is higher and the interest rate lower than initially. The resulting
improvement in output and employment is stronger than in the closed economy.
This is the outcome that would pertain if the U.S. succeeded in persuading China
to allow its exchange rate to become completely market-determined.6
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2.2 Fiscal Policy
In the closed economy, a U.S. fiscal expansion shifts out the goods-market
equilibrium curve along the stationary LM curve in Figure 2, raising output and
the interest rate. In the open economy, however, the rise in output causes
deterioration in both current accounts. The rise in the interest rate, on the other
hand, improves the financial account with Europe by more than enough to offset
the deterioration of the current account, therefore causing the dollar to appreciate
against the euro. This, in turn, causes the goods-market equilibrium curve to shift
inward, as indicated by the lower arrow, and the BP* curve to shift up to
BP*(E1*). The result is to reduce the effectiveness of the fiscal expansion in
achieving a desired reduction in the output gap.
With respect to China, on the other hand, the interest-rate increase is not
large enough to improve the financial account by as much as the rise in U.S.
output has caused the bilateral current account to deteriorate. The dollar is
forced to depreciate against the yuan, pushing the goods-market curve out, as
indicated by the upper arrow, and the BP curve to BP(E 1). These adjustments,
therefore, work in directions opposite to those associated with the dollar‘s
appreciation against the euro. The net effect on the ISXM curve depends on the
magnitudes of the relevant interest-rate and exchange-rate elasticities between
the U.S. and Europe and China, respectively. If the forces indicated by the two
arrows are equal, then the ISXM curve will not move from the position it
reached with the initial fiscal expansion. That is the case depicted in Figure 2.
The likelihood of little or no movement in ISXM rises as the values of the U.S.
marginal propensities to spend on imports from the two trading partners and the
exchange-rate elasticities of the two bilateral trade balances, respectively,
converge toward each other.
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When the adjustments are perfectly offsetting, the effectiveness of the
fiscal expansion does not change relative to the closed-economy outcome. On
the other hand, if the European results dominate, then the effectiveness of fiscal
expansion will be weaker. It will be stronger, if the Chinese side of the
adjustment process dominates.
3. An Open Economy with Two Exchange-Rate Regimes
In this section we assume that China unilaterally pegs the yuan to the U.S. dollar.
When the central bank intervenes in the foreign-exchange market and acquires
dollars with yuan, it is assumed to convert those dollars into U.S. Treasury
securities by purchasing them directly from the U.S. Federal Reserve.7 It is
important to keep in mind that intervention is carried out by the Chinese
authorities rather than the Americans. As they do so, the level of China‘s
reserves will be changing, but in equilibrium there is no ongoing intervention in
this scenario. In equilibrium, autonomous current account imbalances are exactly
offset by autonomous financial flows. In this instance, RC and hence H are
clearly endogenous.
3.1 Monetary Policy
As before, a monetary expansion tends to put upward pressure on U.S. GDP and
downward pressure on U.S. interest rates, causing deterioration in both current
accounts and in both financial accounts. The Chinese authorities intervene in the
foreign-exchange market by supplying yuan in exchange for dollars and use
those dollars to purchase U.S. Treasury securities from the Fed. As a result, U.S.
money supply shrinks until the initial rise in money supply due to the Fed‘s
expansionary policy has been eliminated (as indicated by the westward arrow in
Figure 3) and interest rates and GDP have returned to their original levels. The
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monetary policy is completely ineffective in the pursuit of higher levels of
output and employment.
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It is worth noting in view of the flexibility of the dollar-euro rate, that the
immediate effect of the policy is to push the rate up as it did in Figure 1.
However, that higher rate and its effects on domestic income and employment
are not sustainable, given the current account deficit with China, whose
exchange-market intervention continues until the money supply has returned to
its initial level.
While the end result is to an extent typical of fixed-rate regimes, the
novelty here is that it occurs in the context of a free float between the dollar and
the euro. The dollar depreciation against the euro, which would take place under
floating rates, is prevented by the exigencies of a mixed-rate regime. The
Chinese policy of pegging against the dollar has the effect of immobilizing the
dollar against the euro. China‘s unilateral decision to attach its currency to the
dollar prevents the U.S. from enjoying the benefits of monetary expansion under
floating rates. In this situation, intervention by the Chinese central bank
effectively makes the U.S. a non-floater.
3.2 Fiscal Policy
As before, a fiscal expansion shifts ISXM out and raises both GDP and the rate
of interest. With high capital mobility between the U.S. and Europe, the resulting
improvement of the financial account dominates the deterioration of the current
account. The dollar appreciates against the euro, which shifts the ISXM and BP*
curves in Figure 4 to the left, thereby reducing the potency of the fiscal
expansion in the pursuit of high domestic output and employment. Meanwhile,
the U.S. balance of payments with China deteriorates, because bilateral current
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account worsening exceeds bilateral financial account improvement. The
Chinese authorities intervene to prevent the yuan from appreciating and then
recycle the dollars acquired back to the U.S. by purchasing U.S. Treasury
securities directly from the Fed. U.S. money supply shrinks, causing the LM
curve to shift left in Figure 4. This reduction of liquidity has the effect of further
limiting the expansion of output and employment.
i
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BP*(E0*)
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4. The Foreign Central Bank Asserts Control over the U.S. Money Supply
In this section, we assume that the Chinese authorities recycle intervention
dollars directly into the U.S. financial system by purchasing Treasury securities
from the public. In other words, the Chinese conduct ―open-market operations‖
in the U.S. which have the effect of sterilizing the contractionary impact of their
foreign-exchange market interventions on U.S. money supply.8
4.1 Monetary Policy
We now rewrite equation (4) as follows:
T(yc, y) + KC(i, ic) + RC = 0,

(4a)

where RC represents the ongoing official capital inflow from China. It means that
any excess demand or supply in the bilateral autonomous balance of payments is
automatically accommodated by the Chinese authorities. In other words, the
autonomous imbalance is made ―permanent‖ by this recycling policy.
A U.S. monetary expansion shifts the LM curve out in Figure 5 and puts
upward pressure on output and downward pressure on interest rates, worsening
both current and capital accounts vis-à-vis Europe. The dollar depreciates against
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the euro, which enhances the effect of the monetary policy on output and
employment. (The BP* curve shifts down to the right and the ISXM curve shifts
out.)

i

BP(E)

BP(E)’
LM0
LM1
BP*(E0*)
BP*(E1*)

A

B

ISXM( E1*)

ISXM(E0*)
O

Fig. 5

y

The U.S. current account with China also moves into deficit and the
bilateral autonomous financial account deteriorates as well. But this overall
deterioration in the bilateral autonomous balance of payments is accommodated
by dollar accumulation on the part of the Chinese central bank. The BP curve
moves down to the right. The gap between the initial and new BP curves reflects
the extent of the deficit in the autonomous balance of payments between the U.S.
and China that must be financed by the ongoing inflow of official capital from
China. At point B, a ―permanent‖ payments deficit with China is financed by
official Chinese accumulation of dollar-denominated securities.
4.2 Fiscal Policy
A fiscal expansion in the U.S. shifts the ISXM curve to ISXM(G 1*, E0*) in
Figure 6, tending to raise output and interest rates. The dollar appreciates against
the euro, given the assumed high capital mobility between the U.S. and Europe.
The appreciation to E1 shifts the BP* curve up and to the left and the ISXM
curve moves back inward. These adjustments reflect a weakening of the
effectiveness of the fiscal expansion.
With respect to China, the bilateral current account deteriorates and the
financial account improves. The net effect is a deficit in the autonomous balance
of payments with China. The central bank of China prevents the incipient
appreciation of the yuan by intervening in the foreign exchange market. It then
recycles the dollars acquired in the process back into circulation in the U.S. by
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purchasing U.S. Treasury securities from the public. The imbalance in bilateral
payments is made permanent by this move and China continues to accumulate
claims against the United States. Once again, the automatic adjustment
mechanism has been shut down and the ongoing payments deficit is financed by
Chinese reserve accumulation.9

i
BP(E)

BP(E)
LM

BP*(E1*)
BP*(E0*)
B
A

ISXM (G1*, E0*)
ISXM (G1*, E1*)
ISXM (G0*, E0*)
O

Fig. 6

y

5. Conclusion
In this mixed-regime model, the United States is neither a clear floater nor a full
fixer, a condition which has ramifications for the effectiveness of monetary and
fiscal policies in the context of cyclical stabilization. This paper has used a
modified open-economy macro model to examine the implications. In an initial
section, policy effectiveness is examined in the context of full flexibility of both
exchange rates. The results are broadly consistent with the well-known
benchmark model. However, high capital mobility between the U.S. and Europe,
combined with low mobility between the U.S. and China, causes the two
exchange rates to move in opposite directions in reaction to a fiscal expansion,
with offsetting effects on policy effectiveness.
The paper next explores the case of a pegged yuan in the context of two
scenarios. In the first, China recycles dollars absorbed in the process of
exchange-market intervention by purchasing U.S. Treasury securities directly
from the Fed, while in the second scenario the securities are purchased from the
public. This allows China‘s pegging and recycling operations to ―interfere‖ with
the macro adjustment process within the United States. For example, even
though the dollar is nominally free to fluctuate against the euro, the fact that
China fixes the dollar-yuan rate ―freezes‖ the dollar-euro rate. In another
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example, China‘s purchases of U.S. Treasury securities from the public
essentially shut down the automatic adjustment mechanism associated with fixed
rates.
Notes
1. Sven W. Arndt is Charles M. Stone Professor of Money, Credit and Trade at
Claremont McKenna College. Comments from Tony Cavoli, and from
participants at the meetings of the 2010 Asia Pacific Economics Association in
Hong Kong and of the 2011 International Trade and Finance Association in
Denver are gratefully acknowledged. Thanks to Saumya Lohia and Hao Tang for
valuable research assistance and to the Financial Economics Institute at
Claremont McKenna College for generous research support. Sven W. Arndt,
Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, California 91711, sarndt@cmc.edu
2. According to the IMF (2008), the U.S. operates an ―independently floating‖
exchange-rate regime. The evidence shows that this is so both de jure and de
facto. China‘s regime is classified as a ―fixed peg,‖ meaning no bands. For more
on the ongoing debate over exchange-rate arrangements, see Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2005), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Shambaugh (2004).
3. In the Bretton-Woods system, rates were fixed in a coordinated, consensual
manner, with each country committed to the defense of the agreed-upon rates. In
the present case, China fixes to the dollar unilaterally. While China is not the
first country to have done so, it is the first country large enough to generate
serious repercussions for the U.S.
4. We use this model as the benchmark model because it is well-known. It is the
model found in most undergraduate and graduate textbooks and it is the
paradigm widely used by contemporary policy makers. That does not always
make it the best analytical tool. Alternative model choices would include the
New Open Economy Macro Models as expounded by Obstfeld (2001), Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1995), Lane (2001) and Corsetti (2007) and the portfolio-balance
model (Frankel, 1993; Devereux and Sutherland, 2007).
5. Production networking and processing trade between China and the U.S. may
reduce the response of the trade balance to changes in certain variables,
including the exchange rate and domestic GDP (Arndt (2010)).
6. It is important to note that many countries in Asia fix their currencies to the
dollar; others price their exports in dollars. Many are participants in international
production networks that either feed end products to the United States or engage
the U.S. in reciprocal components trade. These linkages have implications for
exchange-rate and macro adjustment. (See, for example, Arndt and Huemer,
2007).
Suppose, for example, that China allows the yuan to float against the dollar, but
that Singapore fixes its currency against the dollar. Then a yuan appreciation
against the U.S. dollar is also a yuan appreciation against the Singapore dollar.
The U.S. dollar price of end products from China rises, but the yuan price of
components from Singapore falls and with it the cost of end-product exports to
the United States. If Chinese value-added contained in Chinese exports is small,
then dollar depreciation against the yuan has repercussions only for a small part
of the price of end-products from China. The effect of exchange-rate changes on
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the trade balance is reduced and with it the shift of BP due to a given exchangerate shock.
7. We assume for simplicity that China pegs solely to the U.S. dollar and that it
is a peg without bands. In reality, China is believed to operate a basket peg, with
the dollar the dominant currency. China also has allowed the actual rate of the
yuan to fluctuate. These departures from our simple peg will affect the
magnitudes of various outcomes, but not the essential story. For further
discussion of China‘s exchange-rate policy, see Frankel and Wei (2007).
8. In this section, we assume that sterilization is complete. A more realistic case
would lie somewhere between this and the preceding scenario. See Obstfeld
(1982) and Sarno and Taylor (2001), for example, for further discussion of the
effectiveness of sterilization.
9. The fact that many of the components imported by China from third countries
are incorporated into China‘s final-product exports implies that the ―bilateral‖
current account deficit between the U.S. and the People‘s Republic is in reality a
U.S. deficit with a multiplicity of countries. Indeed, only a relatively small part
of the value of the trade imbalance between the U.S. and China is directly
attributable to China as opposed to the countries that supply China with
components and intermediate products. The importance of ―processing‖ trade in
China‘s overall trade is expertly examined in Xing (2011).
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